Reverse nuclear security declines in Russia and the United States

Russia and the United States should urgently reverse the alarming decline in their nuclear security conditions and the United States should reclaim its role as a global nuclear security leader with the following actions:

• Reverse legal measures in the United States that conflict with the internationally accepted principle that nuclear regulatory bodies must remain politically independent, and encourage regulators to develop security measures that align with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) nuclear security guidance
• Drive continuous improvement in nuclear security implementation through regulatory requirements for universal training programs on insider and cyber threats, protocols for personnel to report suspicious behavior, and mandated security culture assessments in nuclear facilities
• Reduce uncertainty around national inventories of weapons-usable nuclear materials by regularly and publicly sharing information about civilian stockpiles of HEU and plutonium through IAEA Information Circulars 549 and 912 and regulatory reports
• Identify excess quantities of HEU and plutonium in their stockpiles and declare a clear process and timeline for elimination or disposition
• Renew efforts to work with countries globally to minimize weapons-usable nuclear materials in civilian use
• Use national statements delivered at high-level political convenings to reinforce the message that excess production of weapons-usable nuclear materials is a source of global nuclear security risk.

What the Data Show

Nuclear security conditions are dramatically declining in Russia and the United States due to the suspension of crucial international cooperation, increases in quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials, and weakened security oversight.

Data Details

Collectively holding 79 percent of the world’s weapons-usable nuclear materials, Russia and the United States have historically anchored international nuclear security efforts. For decades after the Cold War, the United States led global efforts to reduce quantities of weapons-usable nuclear materials, improve security measures, and galvanize support for nuclear security—beginning with the Cooperative Threat Reduction Program in 1991 that upgraded security at dozens of Russian nuclear facilities and led to the removal of hundreds of tons of weapons-usable nuclear materials from vulnerable locations. This cooperation expanded through the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT), a partnership of 89 countries cochaired by Russia and the United States that was announced at the G8 Summit in St. Petersburg, Russia, in 2006 and designed to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect, and respond to nuclear terrorism.

Such cooperation began to erode in 2014, however, when Russia ceased all domestic nuclear security cooperation with the United States after it imposed economic sanctions related to Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Two years later, Russia suspended its participation in the joint Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, under which both countries committed to disposing of 34 metric tons of their plutonium inventories. Following Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, all cooperative efforts ended, including the repatriation of Russian-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) from third countries and official activities by the GICNT. Although the United States and Romania began a replacement initiative to the GICNT, the Global Forum to Prevent Radiological and Nuclear Terrorism, only 63 countries participate and Russia is not among them.

Domestic nuclear security conditions in each country are deteriorating as well. Since the 2023 NTI Index, Russia has produced enough new weapons-usable nuclear materials for more than 300 weapons (4,000 kilograms); half of the material comes from the modernization and expansion of its nuclear weapons arsenal, a clear indication that strategic competition is reversing long running efforts to minimize weapons-usable materials. Russia’s overall score in the 2026 Nuclear Security Index declined by seven points, driven by the renewed production of weapons-usable nuclear materials and by disengagement from multilateral initiatives.

In the United States, a series of executive orders enacted by the White House in 2025 has compromised the political independence and oversight authority of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)—an institution long seen as a global exemplar of independent regulation. One of the orders has undermined the NRC’s independent rulemaking process by requiring all “final significant regulatory actions” to be submitted to the Executive Office of the President for review and approval. Another has blurred the separation between promotion of nuclear technology and independent oversight by directing the NRC to review and revise its regulations and guidance documents on a mandatory 18-month timeline and establish an expedited licensing pathway for nuclear reactor designs tested by the Pentagon and Department of Energy. A third has triggered a broad review and rescission of NRC guidance on organizational culture, workforce reliability, and fitness for duty. These changes have moved the United States out of alignment with internationally recognized principles of nuclear security culture that emphasize trust, openness, and reporting unusual behavior.

These executive orders are a significant driver of the United States’ overall score in the 2026 NTI Index decreasing by 10 points, the largest negative change ever shown by a country between editions of the NTI Index. The full ramifications of these orders will emerge in time, but evidence already shows that they are undermining the U.S. regulatory environment. The NRC has moved to decrease the frequency of cybersecurity assessments and phase out regulator-led force-on-force exercises, replacing them with industry-led exercises—weakening independent oversight of a critical method of assessing security system effectiveness.

This dangerous combination of backsliding and prioritization of competition over shared nuclear security interests creates a worrying void in global nuclear security leadership at a time of accelerating and increasingly complex domestic and global threats. The frequency of terror attacks is on the rise in Russia and the United States, with the number of incidents doubling in Russia and tripling in the United States from 2024 to 2025. Although some of these attacks represent lone-wolf actions with no nuclear ambitions, U.S. domestic violent extremist groups—historically interested in nuclear and radiological terrorism—have also become significantly more active since 2020. Globally, the Islamic State (IS) and its affiliates remain the deadliest terrorist organizations, accounting for 17 percent of all terrorist fatalities worldwide. The IS has explicitly declared its intent to engage in radiological terrorism and has demonstrated a willingness to use weapons of mass destruction through repeated chemical weapons attacks. Its ability to influence and organize global terrorist activities represents a paradigm shift in the terrorist threat, with the IS increasingly diffusing attack strategies, target priorities, and an apocalyptic worldview to splinter groups and lone-wolf actors worldwide.

Cyberattacks on energy infrastructure in Russia doubled between 2023 and 2026 and increased by one-third in the United States over the same period. In the United States, this included persistent threat campaigns to establish access to energy systems to enable future, large-scale cyberattacks in the event of a geopolitical conflict. State-backed hacking groups, including Chinese Volt Typhoon and Iranian CyberAv3ngers have gained access to power grids, telecommunications hubs, and water infrastructure—demonstrating their ability to establish prepositioned footholds to disrupt critical systems. Ukraine has carried out coordinated cyberattacks and drone attacks against Russian energy infrastructure, knocking out 700,000 barrels per day of capacity across 16 major Russian petroleum refineries. This trend is made more concerning by the proven ability of adversaries to conduct cyberattacks on nuclear facilities. Between 2012 and 2018, state-sponsored Russian hackers penetrated digital systems in the United States at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Wolf Creek nuclear power plant, and more than 500 energy sector entities. Russian nuclear facilities experienced similar cyberattacks, with Ukrainian hackers reaching networks at the Beloyarsk nuclear power plant and Rosatom in 2022 to exfiltrate information, including physical protection systems and architectural blueprints.

Recalling lessons learned through decades of cooperation to secure nuclear materials around the world, Russia and the United States should set a positive example by addressing their declining domestic security conditions and reinvesting in cooperative efforts to reduce nuclear risks worldwide.